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SCHOOL VOUCHERS: INVITING THE PUBLIC INTO THE
RELIGIOUS SQUARE
JAMES G. DWYER*
The most prominent question today relating to church-state
relations is how far "charitable choice--the inclusion of religious
social service providers in programs of state aid to private
organizations-can go. What kinds and amounts of aid may the
state supply to religious groups to support their provision of
services that are similar to those provided by state agencies and by
nonreligious private service providers? And how much discretion
may or must the state give religious aid recipients with respect to
how they use the aid?
The types of services for which religious organizations might
receive state aid are quite varied. Many important programs serve
primarily or solely adults and adolescents-for example, programs
of drugrehabilitation and programs ofreproductive counseling. But
the most discussed, and potentially most revolutionary, kind of
service for which religious and other private organizations are
seeking aid todayis a service for children-namely, elementary and
secondary education.1 There is increasing momentum today in favor
of substantial state aid to religious and other private schools. For
"Assistant Professor, William & Mary Law School. The conference for which this Essay
was originally prepared was very stimulating and I benefited greatly from listening to the
other participants as well as from their questions and comments on my presentation. I am
especially grateful to Peter Alces, Neal Devins, Dave Douglas, and Alan Meese for their
helpful comments.
1. Secondary education is also provided to adolescents, ofcourse, who in fact and in law
are in a situation intermediate between childhood and adulthood. For the sake ofsimplicity,
this Essay addresses only the situation of persons who, because they are in early stages of
human development, are insufficiently autonomous or competent to decide for themselves
what kind ofeducation they should receive. It brackets questions about whether and to what
extent the points made would apply to minors who are more capable of making free and
informed decisions about their own education. In other words, I assume that the persons to
whom I refer as "children" are not to be ascribed a right to choose for themselves where they
will attend school and what sort of instruction they should receive, but rather that an adult
must make these choices for them.
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decades states have provided private schools with modest forms of
in-kind (i.e., nonmonetary) aid, but today there is mounting
pressure to provide substantial monetary aid. There are already
school voucher programs that include religious schools in three
jurisdictions-Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida 2 -and nearly
every state has had a proposal for a voucher program on its
legislative agenda in recent years.'
This Essay focuses on school vouchers, which I will treat as
representative of a variety of schemes for directing public money to
private schools on a per-pupil basis.' It presents a few of the ideas
2. The Cleveland and Florida programs are currently under court review. A federal
district court has ruled the Cleveland program unconstitutional, see Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999), and that decision was airmed by the Sixth
Circuit. Seee Nos. 00-3055/00-3060/00-3063, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31367, at *1 (6th Cir.
Dec. 11, 2000). A Florida state trial court ruled that the Florida program violates Florida's
state constitution. See Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370,2000 WL 526364, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 14, 2000). An intermediate state appellate court reversed that decision, see 767 So.2d
668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), and the case awaits resolution by the state's supreme court.
3. Last year at least 25 state legislatures considered voucher proposals. See Michael
Janofsky, School Voucher MeasuresFace Uphill Battles;DisgruntledParentsLeadPushfor
Education Choice, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIE., Jan. 31, 2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL
13947950. As of the November election, 21 states had such proposals pending. See Anjetta
McQueen, VoucherBackersRefuse To Quit; Strategy I to Shift to Legislatures,Wis. STATE J.,
Nov. 10, 2000, at A4, availablein 2000 WL 24294951. During the 1999 legislative session,
a similar number of states considered but did not pass voucher or tuition tax credit
legislation. See, e.g., H.B. 5,21st Leg., 1st Seas. (Alaska 1999); H.B. 2279,44th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 1999); H.B. 2275, 82d G.A., Reg. Seas. (Ark. 1999); S.B. 882, Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1999); S.B. 1132, Jan. Seas. (Conn. 1999); S.B. 59, 140th G.A. (Del. 1999); H.B. 195 (Ga.
1999); S.B. 12,20th Leg. (Haw. 1999); S.B. 0329, 91st G.A. (Ill. 1999); S.B. 633, 111th G.A.,
1st Reg. Seas. (Ind. 1999); H.B. 2462 (Kan. 1999); S.B. 1115, Reg. Seas. (La. 1999); H.B. 668,
Reg. Seas. (Md. 1999); S.B. 216,90th Leg., Reg. Seas. (Mich. 1999); H.B. 31,81st Leg. (Minn.
1999); H.B. 437, Reg. Seas. (Miss. 1999); S.B. 74, 90th G.A., 1st Reg. Seas. (Mo. 1999); L.B.
385, 96th Leg., 1st Reg. Seas. (Neb. 1999); A.S. 507, 70th Reg. Seas. (Nev. 1999); H.B. 633,
156th Seas. (N.H. 1999); S.B. 7,44th Leg., 1st Spec. Seas. (N.M. 1999); H.B. 2366,76th Leg.
(Tex. 1999); H.B. 1670, 56th Leg., Reg. Seas. (Wash. 1999). In addition, the United States
Congress considered during the last session the "Education Savings Account and School
Excellence Act of 1999," which would have allowed a federal income tax deduction for the
expenses of sending a child to a private school. See S. 14, 106th Cong. (1999).
4. The most commonly discussed alternative strategies are tax credits and tax
deductions for tuition costs incurred by parents. Tuition reimbursement has also been tried.
See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,764 (1973). Because these strategies
simply change the timing and mechanics of the state payments, they are for practical
purposes indistinguishable fromvouchers. Underavoucherapproach, ataxbenefit approach,
or a tuition reimbursement approach, or even an approach of making direct payments to
schools on a per-pupil basis, the state pays out money for only one specific
purpose-enrollment ofchildren in private schools. Under all ofthese approaches the private
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I develop, more fully, in the forthcoming book Vouchers Within
Reason.5 The Essay addresses whether states should provide
vouchers for use at religious and other private schools and whether
significant regulation should be attached to vouchers. Analysis of
these questions suggests that vouchers create the likelihood of
unprecedented state control over activities of religious organizations, precisely because the recipients of the service that the state
is supporting are children rather than adults. It also suggests that,
in the case of children's schooling, the state's entrance into the
religious arena is, on the whole, a good thing. In fact, it is long
overdue.
When addressing questions of constitutional interpretation or
political theory presented by conflicts over any aspect of child
rearing, one must first recognize that a proper analysis will
necessarily differ in important respects from an analysis of
situations involving only adults. Because standard modes of
constitutional analysis and political theorizing envision that only
competent adults are involved in disputed matters, and rely
substantially on premises that are true of competent adults but not
of children, the standard modes of analysis cannot simply be
extended without modification to child-rearing contexts.6 Whenever
constitutional scholars or political theorists turn their attention to
schooling or any other child welfare issue (e.g., parents' religious
objection to medical care or core family law issues like child abuse),
they must restructure their analytical apparatus. This is so because
oftwo facts about child-rearing situations that are obvious but often
ignored.
First, it is generally true that in controversies over child rearing,
the persons who have the most important interests at stake are the
children whose upbringing is in dispute. No adults have interests
at stake that are as important as those of the children-not
parents, not other individual citizens who take a special interest in
choices of parents serve as a but-for cause of state money reaching any particular school At
most, the approaches might differ in their symbolic impact and in their distributional effects.
5. JAAiES G. DwYER, VoucHERs W1THIn REASON (forthcoming 2001).
6. The United States Supreme Courtfs decisions regarding parental rights of control

over children's upbringing nevertheless do just that, and thus are defective at their core. See
James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of
Parents'Rights,82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1379-88 (1994).
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the controversy (e.g., the secularist citizen/taxpayers who often
bring Establishment Clause suits in aid-to-school cases), and not
individual members of the rest of society whose interests are
represented collectively by the state. Analysis of these
controversies, then, if it is accurately to reflect the relative
importance of the human interests at stake, as ethical and legal
thinking is generally expected to do, should focus first and foremost
on the interests and rights of the children. Yet most arguments
about child-rearing issues give little attention to, and often simply
ignore, the developmental interests of the children involved. Instead
they focus on the interests and rights of parents, of the rest of
society (e.g., societal interests in pluralism, in creating good
citizens, or in avoiding public expense), and of other individual
adults who claim to be affected by state policies. For that reason
they are deficient.
The second important fact is that children do not have the same
capacities and experience of the world that adults are presumed to
have. Most importantly, they are not autonomous and are not
capable of directing their own lives, but rather must have their lives
directed by others. In addition, while they are more impressionable,
they are also generally oblivious to what actors (such as the state)
outside their immediate community are doing, or are at least less
likely to distinguish the various sources of influence and authority
in their world.
The differences in children's capacities and experience require
that, in analyzing church-state issues in child-rearing contexts, we
abandon some of the assumptions we ordinarily make about rights
and about personal responsibility. For example, in other contexts,
it is typically the case that certain individuals have at stake rights
to effectuate their wishes. Thus, to give content to the rights that
people have, courts need simply look to the people's preferences.
Plaintiffs in free exercise cases assert a right to effectuate
preferences grounded in religious belief, and it is a relatively
straightforward matter to figure out what it would mean to
recognize and respect the person's asserted right: it would mean
satisfying the person's expressed preferences. In Establishment
Clause cases, plaintiffs may or may not be regarded as having a
right at stake (as opposed to simply having standing), but we are
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more inclined to say they have a right at stake the more the
challenged state action works a coercion of their religious beliefs,
which they presumably do not want, or forces them to support
others' exercise of religion against their will.
If children are to be the primary focus of legal and moral concern,
their lack of autonomy means that the individual rights principally
at issue will be of a different sort-that is, protections of interests
identified by persons other than the right holders, rather than
protections of the right-holders' choices. It also means that
responsibilities generally attributed to right holders in connection
with their exercise of rights-principally, the responsibility to bear
the costs of one's choices-are inapposite. In addition, children's
different experience of the world means that state interaction with
religious organizations in child-rearing contexts might not raise, or
might not raise to the same degree, some of the Establishment
Clause concerns that arise in adult contexts-for example, concerns
about symbolic unions or perceived endorsement. On the other
hand, such interaction might create some new concerns, such as
inordinate influence on formation of beliefs.
The analysis of school vouchers in the remainder of this Essay
turns to a substantial degree on, and gives more concrete form to,
these general observations on constitutional and moral reasoning
about child rearing. It offers what I call a "child-centered analysis"
of the two important questions that voucher proposals raise. The
first question is whether states should enact voucher programs. The
second question is what regulations states should attach to
vouchers if they do create such programs. A child centered analysis
-- one that gives primacy to children's interests and rights and that
takes into account children's differences-generates conclusions
unlike any arrived at by the "adult-centered7 approaches that
dominate discussion of this and other child-rearing issues.
I. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILmES IN THE VOUCHER CONTEXT

The first implication of a child-centered analysis is that none of
the parties immediately involved in state funding or regulation of
private schooling should be deemed to have at stake "freedom
rights," by which I mean rights to do what one wants to do, or to be
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free of constraints on one's freedom.' None of the interests of the
adults involved-parents, school operators, religious leaders, and
citizens represented by the state-are adequate to generate such
a right.' Whatever interests those adults have at stake are
insufficiently important and/or are of a kind that, as a matter of
general principles, we simply do not protect with rights in our legal
and moral culture. Thus, those interests would be "trumped"by any
rights that children possess in connection with their schooling.
First, none of the interests that adults possess in connection with
funding for private schools are "fmdamental"; properly speaking,
they are not interests in self-determination or basic welfare. As
nonfundamental interests, they do not have the same claim to the
protection of rights that fundamental interests have. What is truly
at stake for those adults directly involved is how the lives of people
other than themselves-namely, the children involved-will go.9 As
7. Such rights typically are couched in terms ofsubstantive due process or free exercise
of religion. I discuss a different type ofright-a right to equal treatment by the state-below.
See infra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
8. This inadequacy suggests that the Supreme Court's fabrication of parental
constitutional rights in the 1920s was a mistake. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (holding that a state law requiring all children to attend a public school violated
parents' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to direct the upbringing of
their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state law prohibiting
school instruction in a foreign language violated this same right).
9. There is also money at stake, of course. For parents, however, the money is really a
proxy for control over their children's education; vouchers would increase their ability to
exercise such control by increasing their feasible options. In any event, the money parents
spend on private schooling is presumably money they do not need for their basic subsistence,
so their retaining that money is not a fundamental interest. The interest that individual
taxpayers have in how tax revenue is used, or in retaining their per capita share of money
being spent on private education, is even more clearly not a fundamental one.
Some commentators speak of schooling as a vehicle for adult speech-either parental
speech or government speech. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A
ParentalistManifesto, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. 937,1012-33 (1996) (arguing for parental educative
speech rights). But surely parents and state officials who seek control over schooling do not
typically do so to communicate something to the outside world. They do so to secure for
children the kind of education they think the children should have. Nor does anyone need to
exercise control over schooling in order to express their beliefs to the world, or to their
children. Parents have ample opportunity to communicate their views to their children
outside of school hours. In addition, even if schooling did present a unique opportunity for
adults to express particular views, it would be morally inappropriate to treat this important
part ofchildren's lives in such instrumental fashion, as a mechanism for gratifying an adult's
desire to speak. No one has a fundamental interest in using the lives of others to
communicate beliefs, and regarding anyone as entitled to use others this way violates the
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a general matter, an interest in how someone else's life will go is
not a fundamental interest, by any sensible definition of that term.
It is not one of "the 'basic requisites of a man's well-being," or a
"generalized means to a great variety of possible goals... whose
joint realization, in the absence of very special circumstances, is
necessary for the achievement of more ultimate aims.""
This does not change when the "someone else" is one's offspring.
One's child is a distinct person, so control over the child's life is not
a matter of self-determination. Nor is it a matter of securing the
basic aspects of one's own well-being, the things one needs to
function and pursue higher aims. In fact, it is one of the higher
aims we pursue. My children's education is a fundamental aspect
of their well-being. It will determine how their lives will go, how
able they are to pursue self-chosen higher aims later in life. It is a
shaping of their minds, a preparation for lives that they will lead.
One of my higher aims in life is to ensure that this all goes well for
them, and that my children receive the best education possible. As
is true with many other higher aims people pursue-for example,
success in a career or gaining political office-I attach great
subjective importance to this aim. But that subjective importance
does not transform my interests in the matter into fundamental
ones, does not make my children's education a basic aspect of my
well-being, and certainly does not elevate my interests to a position
of greater importance than the interests of my children. Indeed, it
would be paradoxical to say that satisfaction of my desire for their
well-being is more important than their well-being.
In addition, an interest in how someone else's life will go is, as a
general matter, not the kind of interest that generates an
entitlement in our political and legal tradition. In fact, the opposite
basic moral requirement that we treat persons as ends rather than means. See also
discussion infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
10. 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERs 37

(1984). Feinberg gives the following as examples of a fundamental or "welfare interest":
physical health, the integrity and normal functioning of one's body, basic intellectual
abilities, emotional stability, "the capacity to engage normally in social intercourse," some
minimum of financial resources, and "a certain amount of freedom from interference and
coercion." Id. An interest in shaping the lives of other persons does not fit well with this
definition or catalog of essential goods. In fact, Feinberg includes successfully raising a
family among people's ulterior aims. See id.
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is true. As a general matter, we reject the proposition that anyone
should be deemed to have a rightto determine how another person's
life will go." This is evident in every area of life other than the
rearing of minor offspring where people desire to control someone
else's life, including other kinds of relationships involving caretaking of an incompetent person. Guardians for incompetent adults
generally do not possess rights in connection with decision making
for their wards, but rather are deemed to enjoy a privilege of
exercising a limited authority over the lives of their wards.' I have
argued elsewhere that parents should be treated similarly,"3 and
this certainly would be true also of other adults who exercise
some authority over children's lives-for example, citizens who
participate in democratic decision making concerning education
policy. They should be viewed as fiduciaries rather than right
holders.
There is also a discrete group of individuals whose members get
involved in litigation over state aid to religious schools, even though
they are not directly involved in the interactions between state
agencies and the religious entities. This is the group of citizen
bystanders who object to the nature of the church-state interactions
because they are troubled by breaches in the wall of separation
between church and state, and/or because they experience some
coercion of their beliefs by the state's perceived endorsement of, or
union with, religion.
The interests these people (and I count myself among them) have
in connection with children's schooling are significant but hardly
commanding. They have an interest in avoiding any threat to the
structural integrity of the government (i.e., its remaining purely
secular). 4 They also have an interest in the state not acting in any
way that might imply that they are outsiders in this society or that
15
the state generally and consciously disfavors their world view,
11. See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 1405-23.
12. See id. at 1416-20, 1431-32.
13. See id. at 1423-47.
14. The issue of whether vouchers in fact pose a threat to the structural integrity of the
government and whether existing Establishment Clause doctrine, which is intended in part
to prevent such threats, precludes or constrains a voucher program is considered below. See
infra Part II.
15. By"generally," I mean to distinguish merely having one's views on a particular issue
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since this might harm them psychologically and/or pressure
them to change their beliefs. These interests are substantial enough
that such persons are often in the best position to challenge
inappropriate state action relative to education, and they should be
allowed to do so in a court of law. The Supreme Court has in fact
carved out from the general ban on taxpayer standing-which is
based on a premise that an interest in the government's complying
interest-an exception for
with the law is not in itself a substantial
16
Establishment Clause cases.
Courts, however, do not speak of these persons as having a right
at stake. That seems proper, because the state's adherence to the
structural constraint embodied in the Establishment Clause is
better viewed as a duty owed to citizens collectively. Taxpayer
plaintiffs are best seen as private attorneys general, acting as
agents for society as a whole. In addition, an interest in avoiding
offense or a message of exclusion, while more personal, is not of
great moment in most aid-to-school situations. There are situations
in which the personal impact of state action that violates the
Establishment Clause is great, but payments designed to enable
children in all private schools to receive a better secular education
do not create such a situation.
Thus, the interest secularist taxpayers have at stake in the
voucher controversy is diffuse and relatively small. It does not make
a compelling case for saying they have a right at stake. In any
event, even if one insisted that they have a right to protection of
that diffuse and insubstantial interest, one would have to concede
that the right is less weighty and important than a child's right to
a good education.' 7 If the two rights were to conflict, then, the
disfavored, which occurs to the losers in every contest in the political process. By
"consciously," I mean to distinguish finding that the government's policies are on the whole,
but not by design, less consistent with one's world view than with others' world views, which
also must inevitably happen to some group or groups.
16. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that taxpayers had standing to

challenge federal subsidies forparochial schools). The Supreme Court established the general
bar to taxpayer and citizen standing in Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), and
Massachusettsv. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
17. This right of children can be understood as a moral right (i.e., what they should have
as a matter of law), or as a right they possess by virtue of positive law in some states,
because of provisions regarding education in state constitutions or statutes. See Kelly
Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing:Definingthe ConstitutionalRight
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children's rights should trump. Whether thought of in terms of
interests or rights, providing a good education for children is simply
more important than avoiding unintentional and modest effects
on secularist bystanders. It is thus peculiar that courts treat
Establishment Clause values as a trump over all other considerations in the aid-to-school cases, and invalidate any state
support for education in religious' schools that runs contrary to
Establishment Clause doctrine, without considering whether other
values at stake-for example, children's educational needsoutweigh Establishment Clause values in particular situations."8
This seems difficult to justify on the basis of an objective
assessment of the interests or moral rights at stake. It is also
contrary to judicial treatment ofconstitutional provisions that more
clearly confer rights on individuals; when state action infringes
upon the Free Speech Clause or the Free Exercise Clause, for
example, courts ask whether some state interest justifies the
19
infringement.
At best, then, some adults might have lesser rights at stake in
connection with state support for private schooling, but no adults
have rights that can compete with the rights of children for primacy
in this context. The primacy of children's rights in the schooling
context complicates matters, however, because it means that we
cannot determine the content of the relevant rights-that is, what
it would mean to recognize and respect the controlling rights-by
simply looking to the expressed preferences of the right holders.
Nor should we simply assume that the expressed views of any of the
to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. RFv. 399 (2000) (discussing the right to education
under various state laws). The Supreme Court has long hedged on the question of whether
children have a federal constitutional right to a good or minimally adequate education. See
James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and
Education Laws as Denialsof Equal Protectionto Childrenof Religious Objectors, 74 N.C.
L. REV. 1321, 1414-20 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating a
New York statute that provided financial assistance to private schools and provided tuition
reimbursement or tax deductions to parents who sent their children to private school).
19. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (holding that law burdening religious practices could only be upheld upon showing of
a compelling government interest); Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.
214 (1989) (holding that ban on primary endorsements burdened individuals' free speech
rights and could only be upheld upon showing of a compelling state interest).
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adults involved are an adequate proxy for those of the children. As
is the case with incompetent adults, determining the content of
children's rights requires some analysis. This task is more difficult
in connection with the regulation question, which Part II below
addresses. With respect to funding, I think everyone assumes that
children in private schools would be better off with (and therefore
would wish to have, if they were able to develop informed
preferences) state support for their secular education.20 The
pertinent question, then, is whether children in private schools
have a right to this benefit-state funding of their secular
education-which we assume they would want to have.
To answer this question, we should first recognize certain
implications that the focus on children has for the relevance of
personal responsibility. Personal responsibility occasionally
surfaces as an issue in the charitable choice context because
individuals or groups sometimes argue that the state has an
obligation, as a matter of fairness or equal treatment, to subsidize
private analogues to public services for citizens who prefer to
receive the service from a private provider. Most commonly, they
contend that persons who exercise their constitutional right to
religious freedom by choosing to receive a service from their
religious community rather than from the state should not be
penalized for doing so.2 The standard response to this contention
is that fairness and rights to equal treatment do not require such
subsidy, because fairness and equal treatment are served by the
state making the public service available to all.22 Persons who
decline the service through state agencies and instead seek it
through a religious or other private organization have made a
voluntary choice, and properly bear responsibility for that choice.
20. It does appear to be the case that most religious schools do strive to provide a good
secular education-that is, training in general cognitive skills and methods of inquiry in
various disciplines, as well as instruction in the content of state-mandated subjects. That
religious schools have a religious affiliation, display religious symbols, and occasionally
communicate religious views in the course of teaching secular subjects does not mean that
they do not provide secular education. On the other hand, there is ample evidence that some
religious schools do not strive to provide a good secular education, because such an education
is contrary to their religious orientation. Such schools should not receive state support. See
infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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As a general matter, the standard response must be correct, if for
no other reason than accepting the fairness claim across the board
would result in chaos. Every activity engaged in by government is
one as to which some persons might prefer that a private
organization were performing it instead, at least for them. One
group of persons might object on religious grounds to the state's
handling of their personal correspondence, and demand state
funding for a private postal service. Another group might object to
receiving personal protection from the state, and demand a state
subsidy for its private police force. Still another might want its own
tax collection agency. Some might even object to secular
government itself, and demand that tax money be allotted for
private systems of governance. No one seriously maintains tha.t the
state must fund every private analogue to government services that
some individual or group might prefer. Persons who demand
funding for one particular activity tend simply to ignore the
implications of adopting their position as a general rule of state
obligation.
The only acceptable general rule, then, is that government may
elect to fund only its own operations, and need only make the
benefits it offers through its own operations available to all
similarly situated persons to accept or refuse as they choose.2 1 Most

supporters of evenhanded aid to religious and other social service
providers recognize this and do not contend that such aid is
mandatory. They argue simply that it should be permitted-that
23. This is true even of government services that communicate contestable messages or
ideas. For example, if the Smithsonian were the only museum that received funding from the
federal government, no religious organization could claim a right to government funding of
its own museum on the ground that it objects to messages conveyed by exhibits in the
Smithsonian and therefore does not wish to patronize the Smithsonian. Of course, the
religion clauses impose certain restrictions on what messages the government may convey,
prohibiting endorsement of religious or antireligious views. But religious groups frequently
also take offense at views that are ostensibly nonreligious, because those views conflict with
their beliefs, and they might avoid public facilities that they perceive as endorsing those
views. For example, Fundamentalist Christians might refuse on religious grounds to visit
the Museum of Natural History in Washington. Their objection to displays that reflect an
evolutionary understanding of life on earth does not entitle them to state funding for their
own creationism museum. They would have a valid objection to an exhibit in the

Smithsonian ridiculing Fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible, or proclaiming the
infallibility of the Pope, but their objection would entitle them to removal of the exhibit
rather than the funding of their own museum.

2001]

SCHOOL VOUCHERS

975

the Establishment Clause should not act as a barrier to states
voluntarily extending state funding beyond state agencies to private
agencies, including religiously affiliated agencies. In the voucher
context, though, occasionally there have been claims made on behalf
of parents who send their children to private school, or who would
like to, that fairness requires the state to channel public money to
support their preference for private schooling. 2 Courts that have
addressed such a claim, which is typically couched in terms of a
right to equal protection, have uniformly rejected it. They have
invoked the standard response, pointing out that a state-funded
education is available to all, and that these parents are responsible
for, and must accept the financial costs of, the choice they make to
forego this public benefit in favor of a private school education.'
24. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782 n.38 (1973)
(cautioning against providing "a basis for approving through tuition grants the complete
subsidizationof all religious schools on the ground that such action is necessary if the State
is fully to equalize the position of parents who elect such schools"); Miller v. Benson, 878 F.
Supp. 1209, 1212 (E.D. Wis. 1995), vacated as moot, 68 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding
exclusion of religious schools from voucher program against challenge based in part on
parents' right to equal protection); Alan E. Brownstein, Interpretingthe Religion Clauses in
Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values-A CriticalAnalysis of "Neutrality
Theory" and CharitableChoice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. PoL'Y 243, 267 n.51
(1999) (discussing the equal protection analysis in the context of charitable choice); Michael
W. McConnell, The Selective FundingProblem:Abortionsand Religious Schools, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 989, 1017-19 (1991) (arguing that withholdingfunding to religious schools penalizes
the exercise of a constitutional right).
25. Where such aclaim has been advancedin litigation, ittypicallyhas been in situations
where a state was providing funding for private schooling but only for use at nonreligious
private schools-that is, in cases where a state had elected to go beyond funding ofjust its
own agencies and was discriminating on the basis of religious orientation among private
recipients of state funding. Parents who sent their children to religious schools sued to have
the program extended to include religious schools. See, e.g., Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57,
64 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931 (1999); Miller, 878 F. Supp. at 1213; Bagley v.
Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 136 (Me. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 947 (1999). This
type of situation is clearly different from one in which the state confines its funding to state
agencies. In the former case, the parents' fairness claim has more purchase. The personal
responsibility response is less plausible, for although the element of voluntary choice is still
present, the justification for confining state funding to state agencies-that funding of
private alternatives to all government services is not feasible-does not apply. Courts
addressing equal protection objections to funding of only nonreligious private schools have
nevertheless invoked this response, pointing out that parents in that context freely forego
the opportunity to choose either a public school or a nonsectarian private school. See, e.g.,
Strout v. Commissioner of Educ., 13 F. Supp. 2d 112,114 (D. Me. 1998). While there is a good
case to be made that this assertion is mistaken, it is not necessary to present it here, because
in any event there is a stronger case for the proposition that the children in religious schools
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As long as the voucher issue is approached in an adult-centered
way, in which adult interests and rights are given primacy, the
conclusion that state aid to religious and other private schools is at
best permissible, and by no means mandatory, is inescapable. But
a child-centered approach leads to a very different conclusion.
Approaching child-rearing activities from a child-centered perspective renders talk ofpersonal responsibility for voluntary choices
largely impertinent. For while it is true that the adults involved
have made a voluntary choice to forego the state-funded service,
and so have no claim on their own behalf to a fair share of state
spending, the children involved have not made a choice to forego the
state-funded service.2 6 The children therefore are not responsible for
their situation, and any discrimination they suffer-in terms of
state funding for services provided to them-cannot be justified by
reference to personal responsibility. If children lose out on an
important benefit because of the lack of state funding for the
organization from which they are receiving the service,2" they have
have an equal protection claim in this circumstance that is sufficient to require their
inclusion in the voucher scheme. In other words, focusing on children's rights renders an
equal protection claim on behalf of parents moot.
26. As noted at the outset, the analysis here is limited to younger children, who
presumably are not making the decisions regarding their education. One can imagine
situations in which parents, too, cannot really be said to have made a voluntary choice. For
example, if the public schools available for a given child were so exceptionally horrible in
terms of educational quality and/or safety that parents could not satisfy their legal
responsibilities as parents-responsibilities including both the duty to enroll their child in
a school and the duty not to place their child in a dangerous or unhealthy situation-then
the parents effectively would be compelled by the law to enroll their child in a private school.
In such extreme circumstances, parents might have a sound equal protection claim. There
might be disagreement about when circumstances are sufficiently dire, but as noted above,
resolving such disagreement, and thus determining exactly whenparents can be said to have
a sound equal protection claim, is rendered moot by the argument for children's equal
protection rights.
27. The "if"here is important. Children whose parents are so wealthy that receiving a
share of state spending on education would have no effect on their lives would not have a
claim to state funding of their schooling. In other words, a family wealth cap is entirely
appropriate for voucher programs, just as it is for other programs of state assistance. The
cap should be sufficiently high, however, so that it does not exclude any children whose
parents make a significant financial sacrifice to pay for tuition, even if their school has all
the resources it needs to provide an excellent secular education. Such children would
presumably lose out on extracurricular learning activities, such as lessons, camps, and trips,
because of the financial sacrifice by their parents, and thus would be harmed by the denial
of state funding. The harm is even clearer for children whose private schools lack adequate
resources.
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a legitimate claim against the state. They are being improperly
denied their fair share through no choice of their own. Unlike their
parents, they have a legitimate equal protection objection.'
In the voucher context, this leads to the novel conclusion that
state financial support for religious and other private schools is not
only permissible, but is in fact mandatory. Children attending
private schools, many of which struggle to provide even a minimally
adequate education because they lack resources,2 9 are entitled to a
fair share of state spending on education. They should not suffer for
choices their parents have made. They are not their parents and do
not control their parents. As a general moral proposition, people
should not be penalized for choices others make. Moreover, as
a general constitutional principle, the state cannot justify discrimination in the conferral of public benefits by referring to choices
made or actions taken by third parties. 0 As long as the state
empowers parents to enroll their children in private schools, the
state owes the children a duty to ensure that they do not suffer
deprivation as a result. While it would be awkward for parents to
assert this right of children in litigation to compel funding for

28. One might think that the children's complaint really lies with their parents, and that
the children have a right as against their parents to be enrolled in public school, where they
can receive their share of state education spending. However, the state confers on parents
the legal power to choose a private school, so as a matter of law parents violate no right by
choosing a private school Thus, even if one thought the correct solution is for all children to
attend public school, the children's complaint would still lie with the state for failing to
require that they attend public school In any event, it is necessary to treat parents' stateconferred power to choose a private school as a "fixed point" in any analysis of education;
parents' entitlement to make that choice is so entrenched in our culture that an analysis of
a particular policy issue like vouchers that rested on the premise that this entitlement
should be eliminated would be of little practical worth.
29. See, e.g., Joseph Claude Harris, The FundingDilemma FacingCatholic Elementary
and Secondary Schools, in CATHOLIC ScHooLS AT THE CROSSROADS 55 (James Youniss &
John J. Convey eds., 2000) (discussing the financial difficulties facing Catholic schools).
30. For example, this principle is reflected in court decisions invalidating welfare
programs that discriminated against illegitimate children. See, e.g., Clarkv. Jeter, 486 U.S.
456,461-65 (1988) (invalidating on equal protection grounds a state statute that imposed a
limitation period on the ability of children born out of wedlock to establish paternity);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-76 (1977) (holding that a state statute entitling
legitimate children, but not illegitimate children, to a distribution of intestate property from
their fathers violated the Equal Protection Clause); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164,167-76 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a state statute precluding illegitimate children
from bringing worker's compensation claims on behalf of a deceased father).
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private schools, 1 legislators and scholars should recognize this
right of children when they deliberate about voucher initiatives. 2
Thus, as a matter of fairness and as a matter of constitutional
principle, every state in this country must create a voucher
program. Shifting moral positions from the rights of adults to the
rights of childrenmakes an equality-based claim plausible. And this
would actually appear to be the strongest argument for vouchers.
It might seem counterintuitive that the strongest argument is one
predicated on the rights of children already in religious schools. To
the extent that supporters of vouchers focus on the interests of
children at all, it is typically the interests of children currently
attending bad public schools. 3 But those children do not have a
right to vouchers per se. They might have a right to a good
education, on the basis of which they should be able legally to
compel the state to improve their situation, but vouchers are not a
necessary means to that end.3" Vouchers might be one way to
accomplish that aim, and might even be the most cost-effective way
for the state to do so; however, the state can, consistently with this
right, choose other means-such as various sorts of public school
31. It would be uncomfortable, to say the least, for a parent to stand and proclaim, "Your
Honor, my children should not have to suffer for my choices."Ajudge might respond that the
parent is free to make a different choice. The parent could then retort that he should not
have to, but then he would have shifted to a claim based on his own rights.
32. One can also imagine a child advocacy group suing on behalf of the children. For
discussion of the procedural mechanisms for doing so, see Dwyer, supranote 17, at 1465-76.
33. In fact, the Milwaukee program originally was designed so that only students
previously attending public schools could receive vouchers. See Davis v. Grover, 464 N.W.2d
220, 229 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (setting forth Wisconsin statute creating Milwaukee voucher
program).
34. Vouchers are also not necessarily a threat to the welfare of children who remain in
public schools, as opponents of vouchers sometimes imply. The impact of voucher programs
on public schools is outside the scope of this Essay, but it is important to point out that the
assumption implicit in the charge that vouchers will lead to the ruin of public
schools-namely, that education funding as between public and private schools is a zero sum
game-is certainly not true as a conceptual matter. States could start paying for private
schooling and at the same time hold steady or even increase total spending on public schools.
In recent years, there have been several legislative proposals to do just that. See, e.g., S.B.
882, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999); ALB.Xl 24, 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 1999); A.B.YX1 5, 1st
Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 1999), H.B. 2597, 70thLeg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999); H.B. 2681,1999
Sess. (Va. 1999). In addition, even if it were necessarily true as a political matter that
spending on private schooling would result in a decrease in public school funding, it is not
clear that this would nullify the right of children in resource-poor private schools to a share
of state funding.
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choice or a major reform of public schools-if those approaches

would be effective. 5 Such a possibility weakens or defeats
arguments that the state has an obligation to facilitate the transfer
of children from public schools to private schools.
Voucher opponents also might contend that vouchers are not
necessary to ensure a good education for children in any private
school, because their parents can send them to a public school and
the states can ensure that all children receive a good education in
a public school. Some parents do enroll their children in private
schools primarily because the available public schools are
academically inferior or unsafe. Those parents might elect to shift
their children to a public school if the local public schools were
dramatically improved. However, many parents enroll their
children in private schools-particularly religious schoolsprimarily for ideological reasons, and thus many would not transfer
their children to a public school no matter how much the public
schools improved. 6 The children of those parents will remain in
religious schools, and in order for them to benefit from state
spending on education the state will .have to direct funds to the
religious schools.
To argue against this result, therefore, voucher opponents will
have to contend that attendance at a religious school is a matter of
private choice for which private parties, not the state, are
responsible. For reasons presented above, this contention is
untenable. The children who suffer educational deprivation are
not responsible for their parents' choices. The state, however, does
35. Joseph Viteritti argues that charter schooling, which is one sort of public school
choice, has been quite successful in improving the quality ofeducation for some children. See
JOSEPH P. VITERITrI, CHOOSING EQUALTY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIViL
SOCIETY 72-76 (1999). While it is a common refrain among voucher proponents that states
have poured money into public schools for decades without improving them, see id. at 3-4,
a charge so vague that it is difficult to prove or deny, there certainly have been instances
where states have dramatically improved some public schools. See, e.g., LINDA DARLINGHAMMOND, THE RIGHTTO LEARN: ABLUEPRINT FOR CREATING SCHOOLS THAT WORK 2-4, 99105 (1997); DEBORAH MEIER, THE POwER OF THEIR IDEAS: LESSONS FOR AMERICA FROM A
SMAIL SCHOOL IN HARLEM 15-38 (1995); VrTERrrrI, supra,at 60-61, 63; Richard Rothstein,
The Myth ofPublicSchoolFailure,AM. PROsPECT, Spring 1993, at 20; Jodi Wilgoren, Seeking
to Clone Schools ofSuccess for Poor,N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 2000, at Al.
36. As noted above, I treat the power of parents to do this as a fixed point for the sake
of analysis. See supranote 28.
37. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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bear some responsibility for their situation, because it empowers
parents to make that choice, and then discriminates among children
based on their parents' exercise of that state-conferred power. 8
Analogously, if a state made education mandatory for boys but not
for girls (i.e., conferred the benefit of a statutory right to an
education only on boys), the discrimination could not be dismissed
by contending that the proper redress for girls who receive no
schooling is for their parents voluntarily to send them to school.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

ON STATE SPENDING

The foregoing analysis, leading to the conclusion that children in
private schools have an equal protection right to vouchers, did not
directly consider whether, under existing legal doctrine, there are
any constitutional constraints on-state spending that conflict with,
and potentially override, that right. This section of this Essay
addresses two constitutional prohibitions that bear on the voucher
debate: the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
It shows that those prohibitions simply require that certain
regulations or conditions be attached to vouchers. However, those
regulations would profoundly affect private schooling in this
country.
A. Establishment Clause Strictures
I argued above that the interests of secularist bystanders-those
who typically challenge aid to religious schools under the
Establishment Clause-are not sufficient to override the rights of
children. 9 The Establishment Clause, however, protects values
other than simply the interests of these individuals. It also
preserves a division of power between two very powerful social
institutions-government and religion-so that neither can become
38. Because the Supreme Court has held that states are constitutionally required to give
parents the power to choose a private school for their children, and therefore the power to
waive children's statutory rights to a public school education, see Pierce v. Society ofSisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), "the state" here refers collectively to state governments and the
federal judiciary.
39. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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tyrannical. It might protect other societal values as well. While
Establishment Clause doctrine does not typically balance the values
that the Clause protects against the values that the state is trying
to promote through the action or program that is being challenged,
it does call for a rough assessment of the degree to which the values
that the Clause protects are threatened by the state action. Thus,
even for a child-centered analysis of state funding of private childrearing services, the doctrine provides useful guidance. If vouchers
are incompatible with existing doctrine, this suggests that they
threaten Establishment Clause values to a significant degree. This
in turn would suggest the need for a careful balancing of children's
welfare against those values. Such a balancing might show that
efforts to help children must follow certain guidelines, and perhaps
even that children's welfare must be sacrificed to some degree in
some cases. I therefore consider in this section what existing
doctrine has to say about vouchers. This discussion is necessarily
cursory, and therefore somewhat conclusory; it is meant to suggest
a line of reasoning rather than to provide a definitive argument.
On the general question of state aid to private social service
providers, the neutrality position has come to dominate judicial
application of the Establishment Clause.4 ' The neutrality position
asserts that states are free to include private entities affiliatedwith
a religious organization in programs of state aid to support the
secular functions of public and private-service providers. They may
deal "evenhandedly" with religious and nonreligious institutions.
Based on this view, the Supreme Court has approved several forms
40. I offer a more thorough and better supported analysis of the constitutional issues in
a forthcoming book on vouchers. See DYWER, supranote 5.
41. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2556-57 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(agreeingwith the four-justice"plurality's recognition that neutralityis an important reason
for upholding government-aid programs against Establishment Clause challenges," and
objecting only that 'the plurality's treatment of neutrality comes close to assigning that
factor singular importance in the future adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges to
government school-aid programs"); id. at 2573 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("There maybe no aid
supporting a sectarian school's religious exercise or the discharge of its religious mission,
while aid of a secular character with no discernible benefit to such a sectarian objective is
allowable."); id. at 2576 (discussing the Court's provision of "definitive examples of public
benefits provided pervasively throughout society that would be of some value to organized
religion but not in a way or to a degree that could sensibly be described as giving it aid or
violating the neutrality requireiaent" in the case ofEverson v. Boardof Education,330 U.S.
1, 16-18 (1947)).
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of aid to religious groups or to individuals patronizing religious
institutions-for example, printing services for a religious student
newspaper at a public university,4 2 a tuition grant for a blind adult
to use at a theological college,' and monetary aid to religious
groups providing reproductive counseling."
Traditionally, however, the Court has treated religious
elementary and secondary schools differently from other religious
institutions. It has held that aiding religious schools presents
special problems because, in the Court's view, they tend to be, more
45
so than other kinds of service providers, "pervasively sectarian."
This term generally connotes that an institution's secular and
religious activities are so integrated that aid to any part of the
institution would necessarily amount to aid for religious
instruction. For this reason, the Court struck down an aid program
that closely resembled a voucher program in Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist.41 In Nyquist, the Court held violative of the
Establishment Clause a scheme whereby the State of New York
reimbursed parents for tuition payments they made to private
schools, including religious schools.4" If the Court followed this
decision today, it would have to strike down voucher programs that
included religious schools. In recent years, however, the Court has
become more accepting of aid to religious schools, and has approved
several nonmonetary forms of aid to religious and other private
49
8
schools, such as state-paid remedial instructors" and computers
that would not have survived an Establishment Clause challenge
42. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
43. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
44. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
45. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617-18 (1971). The "pervasively sectarian"
standard has been the subject ofmuch commentary. See Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues,and
Misconceptions:No-Aid Separationismand the EstablishmentClause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETmIcs & PuB. POL'Y 285, 298-300 (1999); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of
Separationand Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 55 (1997).
46. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
47. See id. at 780-89.
48. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding program of federal and state
aid to pay for remedial reading instruction in religious and other private schools as well as
in public schools).
49. See Mitchellv. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (upholding program of federal and state
aid to local school districts to be used for purchasing instructional materials and equipment,
including computers, for religious and other private schools as well as public schools).
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twenty years ago. At this point, there appears to be sharp division
in the Court regarding whether the line can be crossed from
in-kind aid to monetary aid, and from small-scale aid to largescale aid.5" There is much debate as to how the swing vote in
this area-specifically, Justice O'Connor's-would come down on
vouchers, and there is material in her recent opinions to give both
sides hope and concern.5 1
Putting aside predictions about what the Court will do when it
inevitably entertains a challenge to school vouchers, there is a good
case to be made that voucher programs should not be deemed to
violate the Establishment Clause, or in other words, do not conflict
with the best interpretation of the Clause if they are properly
structured. This is the rub; Establishment Clause values and
clearly established Establishment Clause doctrine unquestionably
require that if state financial support for the education of children
in religious schools is permissible, it must be carefully constrained.

50. Compareid. at 2546 n.8 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that "principles ofneutrality
and private choice would be adequate to address those special risks" of advancing religion
posed by monetary relief), and id. at 2542 n.6 (arguing that the percentage or absolute
amount of aid that reaches religious schools under a program of state aid is irrelevant for
Establishment Clause purposes), with id.at2585-86(SouterJ., dissenting) (contending that
the Establishment Clause absolutely prohibits cash grants to religious schools), and id. at
2589 ("[We have recognized what is obvious (however imprecise), in holding 'substantial'
amounts of aid to be unconstitutional .... ).
51. Compare id. at 2558-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that it is
constitutionally permissible for state monetary aid to reach religious schools and to be used
to advance religion in those schools so long as the aid goes directly in the first instance to
private individuals who can choose to use the aid at a religious school or a nonreligious
school), and id. at 2566 (repeatedly attaching the modifier "direct"to "money grants" or
"monetary aid" or "cash aid7 when discussing kinds of aid that are constitutionally
problematic), with id. at 2562 (emphasizing that the aid in question was supplemental,
rather than supplanting religious schools' private funding, that no state money ever reached
the coffers of religious schools, and that the state retained title to the instructional material
and equipment, thus ensuring "that religious schools reap no financial benefit"), and id. at
2566 (emphasizing the special concerns raised by monetary aid, because preventing state
financial support for religious activity was "the original object of the Establishment Clause's
prohibition"), and id. at 2567 (emphasizing that the statutory program under review
contained a prohibition on use of aid for religious worship or instruction), and id. at 2568
(reaffirming her position in School District of GrandRapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985),
which found unconstitutional state payment for religious school teachers to teach secular
subjects after regular school hours on the grounds that "[blecause the government financed
the entirety of such classes, any religious indoctrination taking place therein would be
directly attributable to the government").
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This is necessary to avoid the appearance or reality that aid is
simply subsidizing religious practices.
When the Court has approved of monetary aid to religious social
service providers other than schools, it has insisted that the state
implement measures to ensure that the aid is used for the secular
purpose that is the reason for the state aid. For example, in Bowen
v. Kendrick,5 2 the Court upheld the Adolescent Family Life Act,
which authorized grants to support public and private organizations
in counseling teens on premarital sexual relations and pregnancy.
In doing so, the Court stated: "There is no doubt that the monitoring of AFLA grants is necessary if the Secretary is to ensure
that public money is to be spent in the way that Congress intended
and in a way that comports with the Establishment Clause.""3 The
Court indicated that state monitors would need to review for
religious content the educational materials that aid recipients used
and to perform on-site visits to ensure that the aid was not being
used for "'specifically religious activit[iesi."'
Similarly, when the Court has approved in-kind aid to private
elementary and secondary schools, it has emphasized that there
were sufficient safeguards in place to ensure that the aid would
promote secular education and not religious instruction.5 5 In the.
recent Mitchell v. Helms" decision, in which the Court upheld state
provision of instructional and educational materials and equipment
to religious schools, the plurality opinion stated as a general rule
that
if the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular
purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to
religion, to all who adequatelyfurther that purpose... then it
is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has
the effect of furthering that secular purpose.5"
52. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).

53. Id. at 615.
54. Id. at 621 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
55. See, e.g., Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2555; Agostiniv. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,221-24,226-27,
234-35 (1997).
56. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
57. Id. at 2541 (emphasis added); see also id at 2551 ("[T]he religious nature of a
recipient should not matter to the constitutional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately
furthers the government's secular purpose.").
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The other five Justices, including Justice O'Connor, expressed
even more strongly that the state must ensure that its58aid is used
for the secular purpose motivating the program of aid.
There is also near unanimous agreement among legal scholars
that state funding for private-service providers must, at a
minimum, satisfy the two requirements suggested by the Court in
Mitchell. First, when an organization engages in both predominantly secular and inherently religious activities, the state
may fund only the former.59 Second, the state must condition
58. See id. at 2558 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although'our cases have permitted some
governmentfundingof secular functions performed by sectarian organizations,' our decisions
'provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities.' (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)));
i&i at 2589 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have consistently understood the Establishment
Clause to impose a substantive prohibition against public aid to religion and, hence, to the
religious mission of sectarian schools."); id. at 2590 ("The object of all enquiries into such
matters is ... is the benefit intended to aid in providing the religious element of the
education and is it likely to do so?"). The four Justices signing onto the plurality opinion were
not concerned to ensure that in-kind aid was not "diverted" to religious purposes. See id. at
2547-49 (plurality opinion). Implicit in this position, however, seems to be the view that so
long as an institution is devoting a large portion of its budget to serving the state's secular
purpose, aid to the institution that is clearly less than the portion of its budget devoted to
secular education is permissible, regardless of how it ultimately gets mixed into the
institution's resources as a whole. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. In other words,
all forms of aid are considered fingible with privately raised resources, and thus it does not
make sense to track the state-provided aid and to make judgments about how it is used
relative to the institution's other resources. The other five Justices did not share this view,
and expressed substantial concern about the divertibility of aid. See id. at 2558 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("I . . . disagree with the plurality's conclusion that actual diversion of
government aid to religious indoctrination is consistent with the Establishment Clause ....
[W]e have long been concerned that secular government aid not be diverted to the
advancement of religion .... [Actual diversion is constitutionally impermissible."); id at
2585 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Mie have long held government aid invalid when
circumstances would allow its diversion to religious education."); id. at 2591-96 (finding the
state aid in question unconstitutional because of its divertibility and actual diversion to
religious instruction).
59. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 45, at 288-89 ("[I1n neutrality theory... monies are to
be spent only for the purposes set out in the service contract or grant. These
purposes-having already satisfiedLemon's secular-purpose prong-necessarily exclude use
of the monies for inherently religious programming."); Ira C. Lupu, To ControlFactionand
ProtectLiberty:A GeneralTheory ofthe Religion Clauses,7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357,
362 (1996) (stating that neutrality requires "the state refrain from subsidizing religion qua
religion); McConnell, supranote 24, at 1018 ("[No one disputes that it is just and proper for
the government to refuse to pay the incremental cost of religious components of the
education, in light of the conscientious objection many taxpayers have toward mandatory
support for religious instruction."); MichaelJ. PerryReligion,Politics,andthe Constitution,
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participation in any program of state aid on compliance with such
regulations as are necessary to ensure that recipients in fact
further the secular aim that is the purpose for the aid program. 0
The correctness of this position appears unassailable. There can be
no public purpose to the state's funding religious activity per se.
Equally, there can be no public purpose to funding an activity that
purports to provide the secular good that the state is seeking to
promote, but in fact does not. For example, if the state funds
private providers of mental health services for female rape victims,
then an organization whose counseling of rape victims consists
entirely of berating them for not submitting more readily to men,
based on a religious belief that a woman's function and salvation lie
in serving the sexual needs of men, should not qualify for aid. It is
not serving the secular purpose the aid was intended to achieve.
What the religious organization regards as promoting the wellbeing of women the state does not so regard. Indeed, what the
organization does is the antithesis of what the state is striving to
promote. There must be regulations in place to prevent such an
organization from receiving aid.
There is a clear consensus, therefore, that at a minimum, any
program of aid to private service providers that includes religious
organizations must attach adequate regulations to the aid to ensure
that 1) the aid is not provided for inherently religious activities, and
that 2) the aid is used to further the secular purpose for the aid. In
theory, it should be possible to take the same approach to
vouchers-to allow state funding of religious schools, but require
7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 407, 427 (1996) (stating that aid to religious schools is

acceptable "if the criteria for such aid are religiously neutral").
60. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A ConstitutionalCasefor GovernmentalCooperationwith

Faith-BasedSocial Service Providers,46 EMORY L.J. 1, 36 (1997) ("[Tihe public purpose is
for government and the independent sector to engage in a cooperative program that
addresses the temporal needs of the ultimate beneficiaries, and to do so in a manner that
enhances the quality or quantity of the services to those beneficiaries.") (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). Esbeck takes the position that mere facial neutrality among secular and
religious entities is not sufficient to ensure that aid serves the public purpose. See id.; cf
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 689,623-24 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing, in
joining decision to uphold state support for secular teen counseling provided by religious
organizations, that aid to religious organizations is permissible only insofar as it will clearly
be directed toward satisfaction of temporal needs); id. at 624-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(indicating that aid to religious organizations is permissible so long as it is actually used by
them for the designated public purpose).
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that the funding be limited to payment for secular activities and
that the secular activities advance the purpose-secular
education-intended by the state. In the view of some people, the
first requirement would in practice preclude monetary aid to
religious schools. They believe that money is readily divertible from
secular to sectarian use and/or that secular and religious
activities/instruction are so inextricably intertwined, that there is
no feasible way of ensuring that the aid is used only for secular
activities and instruction. 6
From a certain economic perspective, however, the first
requirement demands only that the value of aid to religious
organizations not exceed the portion of an entity's budget devoted
to activities that are predominantly secular.62 For example, on this
economic view, if a religious organization operates a homeless
shelter, and in addition to providing meals and sleeping quarters
conducts worship services for guests, the value of state aid should
not exceed the percentage of the shelter's budget that reflects costs
for things like food and bedding that, unlike worship service, are
not inherently religious in the same manner as a worship service.63
The state should not pay for religious worship, and from this
economic perspective it does not do so as long as it limits the
amount of aid to what might be called the secular component of an
organization's budget. That it "frees up" private money for use in
religious activities is irrelevant, because it is no concern of the state
what people do with private money. Moreover, that it pays for
activities to which a religious service provider might add a religious
flavor (e.g., by having religious symbols in the homeless shelter or
byhomeless shelter workers conveying words offaith while handing

61. See Steven K. Green, The LegalArgumentAgainstPrivateSchool Choice, 62 U. CIN.
L. REv. 37,49-54 (1993).
62. I adopted this view after being persuaded by an article by Michael W. McConnell &
Richard A. Posner, An EconomicApproachto Issues ofReligiousFreedom,56U. Cm. L. REV.
1 (1989). The simplified treatment this Essay affords to McConnell and Posner's theory
leaves many questions unanswered, which I address in Vouchers WithinReason (forthcoming
2001).
63. Qf Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2541 (plurality opinion) ("The government, in crafting such
an aid program, has had to conclude that a given level of aid is necessary to further that
purpose among secular recipients and has provided no more than that same level to religious
recipients.").

988

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:963

out food) is also irrelevant, because that does not increase the cost
of the activity nor detract from the secular value it provides.
Analogously, a voucher program would satisfy the first requirement so long as the face value of the voucher used at any particular
religious school did not exceed the portion of the school's budget
devoted to activities that are not inherently religious (e.g., not
catechism class or worship services). 6 ' That vouchers might free up
private money previously devoted to secular education, so that a
school can also devote more resources to religious instruction and
religious activities, would be irrelevant. That the classrooms in
which secular instruction takes place have religious symbols, and
that some instructional materials used might have a religious slant
or significance, would also be irrelevant.65 As long as a school is
primarily engaged in providing a secular education to students, as
is true of most (but not all) religious schools, state funding of a large
portion of the schools budget should not be objectionable.
While it does not appear that a majority of Supreme Court
Justices currently embrace this economic view, and while it would
not obviate all anti-establishment worries if the view were correct
(because public perception also matters), this view makes a lot of
sense. It also has the virtue of allowing states to go forward with
their extremely important purpose of improving the education
of children in private schools. It shows that the first condition on
state aid to religious institutions identified above is not an
insurmountable obstacle to vouchers. The first condition would
64. The Cleveland program appears designed to accomplish this end. Under the
Cleveland program, the face value of vouchers may not exceed 90% of a school's tuition or
$2,500, whichever is less. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelmn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834,836 (N.D. Ohio
1999), affd, Nos. 00-3055/3060/3063,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31367, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11,
2000). Any given voucher school in Cleveland could, however, be devoting much less than
90% of its tuition to secular education, and so effectively be receiving money for religious
activities and instruction. The Milwaukee program does not appear even designed to
accomplish this end. Under that program, the face value of vouchers is the lesser of the
state's per pupil expenditures onpublic schools and the private school's 'operating and debt
service cost per pupil that is related to educational programming.- Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602, 607-09 (Wis. 1998) (quoting WIs. STAT. § 121.08 (1995)). The governing statute
does not exclude religious instruction from the definition of educational programming, so
recipient schools apparently may use state money to pay salaries of catechism teachers, to
buy religious books, and even to maintain a chapelifthat is somehow "related to" educational
programming. See Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 414 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
65. McConnell offers the example of a Christian school using The Pgrim's Progress in
a literature course. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1020.
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simply require that the state engage in sufficient oversight to
determine roughly how much of a recipient school's budget is
devoted to state-mandated courses.
The second condition, however-that aid actually be used to
further the state's secular purposes-generates substantial
regulatory requirements, including imposition of comprehensive
and robust educational standards on all recipient schools. This is
necessary to ensure that the aid is being used to provide secular
instruction rather than religious instruction under the guise of
state-mandated courses. The available empirical evidence suggests
that there are many schools in this country today-particularly
Fundamentalist Christian schools-that ostensibly teach statemandated courses but so infuse them with religious content and
so distort the secular content to conform to religious beliefs that
the courses in effect become religious activities.6 6 The state
cannot constitutionally pay for that sort of practice, even if the
schools themselves characterize it as secular instruction. The
Establishment Clause dictates against it, and the rights of children
in the schools do not support it. In fact, children's equal protection
right to state support for their secular education supports the
conclusion that the state may not fund such a school at all, because
the funding encourages and facilitates the denial of a secular
education.
How the necessary standards would be enforced is a very complex
matter outside the scope of this Essay.6" I will simply note that if
66. See JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 13-37 (1998)
(summarizing and citing empirical studies).
67. I have previously argued that such a school should not even be allowed to exist. See
generally id Nevertheless, there is virtually no political will today to close such schools. The
most that can realistically be done for the children in such schools is to refuse to support
their educational deprivation, and to communicate publicly, if only implicitly by refusing to
support it, the state's disapproval of these schools.
68. I address enforcement issues in Vouchers Within Reason, (forthcoming 2001). The
most difficult issues arise with respect to religious schools that strive to provide a good
secular education but nevertheless fail to meet established standards. The basic principle
that children should not suffer educational deprivation because of the choices or failings of
adults would seem to preclude ever denying financial support to such a school Public schools
also face this conundrum. There is much interest now in "grading" public schools, but it is
not clear what the state should do with schools that are failing, cutting funding is likely to
make the schools even worse. An alternative solution for both public and private schools that
are failing because of incompetence might be to increase state supervision or control of
schools that fail to meet standards. In addition, standards ideally should be adjusted to
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testing were used-as some advocates for religious schools
suggest-the testing would have to be much more comprehensive
and rigorous than that currently employed in most states, which
typically measures only a narrow range of very basic skills.69 There
might be a limit to how much interference with content of
instruction the courts would tolerate before saying that the
interference violates parents' right to control their children's
upbringing. But certainly states can and should require, for
example, administration of testing for critical thinking skills,
problem solving, mastery of methods of inquiry in a variety of
disciplines, and knowledge of mainstream views in the hard and
social sciences, in addition to testing for elemental reading, writing,
and math skills. This effectively would discriminate against some
religious organizations-those that, for example, do not value, and
perhaps even discourage, critical thinking and mastery of scientific
methods, or that do not want their students to learn mainstream
views on certain topics. This discrimination among religious groups
is necessary to comply with the strictures of the Establishment
Clause.
In sum, the Establishment Clause demands that if states are
permitted to provide monetary aid to religious schools, they must
also impose regulations on aid recipients to ensure that all taxpayer
money is furthering a secular purpose and not being used to fund
religious activities. This would substantially transform the nature
of private schooling in this country, which, from a child-centered
perspective, would be a good thing. This conclusion is bolstered by
an independent consideration of the special obligation the state
owes to children in private schools to ensure that they receive a
good secular education.
This special obligation arises for two reasons. First, the state is
partly responsible for the fact that the children are in a private
school rather than in a public school. The state, through decisions
of the Supreme Court and through state statutes, has conferred on
parents the power to place their children in private schools rather
reflect the great obstacles that many public and private schools have to overcome-in
particular, a difficult social environment and a large number of at-risk or special needs
children.
69. On the inadequacies of commonly used tests, see DARLING-HAMMOND, supranote 35,
at 57-61, 88-89.
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than public schools. State-conferred parental rights are thus a butfor cause of some children being in private rather than public
schools. In addition, going beyond permittingprivate schooling to
subsidizing private schooling further implicates the state in the
situation of these children. It heightens the state's obligation to
ensure that the children whose parents place them in private
schools receive a good secular education and are not subjected to
harmful practices. The Supreme Court has said on several
occasions that the state is constitutionally permitted to do this.70 I
am arguing here that the state is morally compelled to do this.
Second, another equality issue arises that supports the
conclusion that states must regulate private schools regardless of
whether it provides aid to them. States impose substantial
regulation on public schools to promote the quality of secular
education, such as teacher qualifications, mandatory content,
achievement standards, etc. 7 Such regulation-at least when it
works properly, and it does so much more than critics of public
schools admit 72 -is a state-conferred benefit to children in public
70. For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court held that
parents have a right to send their children to private schools, but clarified that" n]o question
is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise, and examine them, their teachers and pupils." Id. at 534. Moreover, in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Justice White in a concurring opinion stated that the Court's
earlier decision in Piercelent "no support to the contention that parents may replace state
educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views ofwhat knowledge a child needs
to be a productive and happy member ofsociety," but rather"held simply that while a State
may posit [educational] standards," it may not require children to receive their education in
public schools. Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring). At least some degree ofinterference with
the freedom of parents and school operators, the Court has said, is justified by the state's
great interest in, and responsibility for, protecting the educational interests of children. See,
e.g., id. at 213-14; id. at 238 (White, J., concurring); see also Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d
1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[Ilt is 'settled beyond dispute, as a legal matter, that the state
has a compelling interest in ensuring that all its citizens are being adequately educated.'
(quoting trial court)); Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979) ("There
is a compelling state interest in the choice and adherence to a suitable curriculum for the
benefit of our young citizens and society.").
71. For a summary ofthe regulatory environment in which public schools in this country
operate, see Dwyer, supra note 17, at 1329-38.
72. See VrrERrI,supra note 35, at 12 ("Public education is doing a lot better than the
evacuation thesis [i.e., the thesis that vouchers will cause a great number ofparents to shift
their children from public to private schools] implies."). Ifparents' views are indicative ofthe
quality of public schooling and of regulation of schooling, then it is worth noting that the
great majority of parents in suburban areas rate the local public schools highly. See id. In
addition, an overwhelming majority ofparents in all areas favor imposing stricterstandards
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schools just as much as state funding is. As is true of funding,
children in private schools are entitled to that benefit as a matter
of equal protection doctrine.7" They should not have to forfeit that
important protection of their developmental interests because of
their parents' choice of schools. To deny it to them, as states now do
by leaving private schools virtually unregulated,74 violates their
right to equal protection. Therefore, the state has not only a moral
obligation to ensure that children in all private schools receive a
good secular education, but also a constitutionalobligation to do so.
This is so regardless of whether the state is also funding private
schools. All states should already be imposing substantial regulations on private schools.
Thus, both because of Establishment Clause strictures and
because of the government's legal and moral obligation to all
children, states must attach to vouchers whatever regulatory
strings are needed to ensure that children in all private schools
receive a good secular education. Yet to date, none of the voucher
programs that any state has enacted or seriously considered has
contained the necessary regulatory strings.75 Programs now in place
leave voucher schools in more or less the same unregulated
situation, with respect to curriculum, that they were in before
vouchers came along, doing little more than imposing some
additional paperwork requirements.7" It is for thisreason that those
on schools. See id. at 7. Where public schools fail, parents do not appear to blame state
regulation, but rather lack of safety, crumbling buildings, behavior problems, inability to
attract and retain good teachers, and other obstacles that arise from the social environment
rather than from regulation. See id. at 6-7.
73. See Dwyer, supra note 17, at 1365-1465.
74. For a description of state statutes relating to private schools, see id. at 1338-43.
75. Among voucher bills considered, but not approved in 1999, most provided that
participating schools would simplyhave to satisfy the extant requirements for private schools
in the state. See, e.g., S.B. 882, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999); H.B. 195 (Ga. 1999); S.B. 329, 91st
G.A. (IMI.1999); H.B. 2462 (Kan. 1999); H.B. 1953 (La. 1999); S.B. 31 (Mich. 1999); H.B. 437,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1999); H.B. 147, 123d G.A., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999). Some bills stated
explicitly that the bill would not authorize state education officials to exercise any increased
control or supervision over private schools. See, e.g., H.B. 2275, 82d G.A, Reg. Sess § 12b
(Ark. 1999); H.B. 195 (Ga. 1999); H.B. 2462 (Kan. 1999); S.B. 1115, Reg. Sess. (La. 1999);
H.B. 937, 90th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1999).
76. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.0537 (West Supp. 2000) (instituting statewide voucher
program); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.976 (West Supp. 2000) (instituting pilot voucher
program); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1999) (instituting a voucher program in
Milwaukee). To illustrate, the Wisconsin voucher law requires that participating schools
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programs are unconstitutional. They are giving money to religious
institutions with no assurance that the money is being used to
provide secular education, rather than to support denial of a good
secular education and perhaps even activities that affirmatively
harm children-for example, explicit and aggressive sexist teaching.
This is grossly irresponsible as well as unconstitutional.
For some schools, a major transformation would be necessary
before they should be able to qualify for vouchers. There are schools
in existence now that, because of the religious beliefs of their
operators, are like the hypothetical rape counseling service
previously mentioned," in that they intentionally act in ways
contrary to the state's secular purpose for providing aid. These
schools intentionally deprive their pupils of what the state regards
as a good education. State regulators have known for decades that
some schools operate in a manner antithetical to the state's
educational aims-stifling rather than fostering critical and
independent thought, refusing to teach scientific methods, and
grossly distorting the content of the core curriculum.7" But state
officials long ago gave up trying to impose and enforce regulations
in the face of vehement opposition by parents and religious
leaders.79
operate in a building that complies with health and safety laws, annually submit an
independent financial audit, admit students on a non-racially-discriminatry basis and
without regard to past academic performance or membership in a religious organization, and
allow parents to opt out of religious activities at the school for their children. See id. None
of these requirements affect curriculum. A sixth condition for participation could, but need
not, impact the quality of instruction in voucher schools. Voucher schools in Milwaukee are
required to satisfy one of the four following requirements: 1) that 70%of voucher students
advance one grade level each year, 2) that voucher students have an average attendance of
at least 90%; 3) that at least 80% of voucher students "demonstrate significant academic
progress," or 4) that at least 70% of voucher families "meet parent involvement criteria
established by the private school." Id. § 119.23 (7XA). Thus, a school can participate if its
students have a 90% attendance rate, regardless of what the students are learning. In
addition, the statute and implementing regulations leave it more or less entirely up to
voucher schools themselves to define what it means to advance a grade level and what
constitutes parent involvement. See id.; Wis. ADMIN. CODE § PI 35.03(5)(a).
77. See supratext accompanying note 60.
78. On the importance of critical thinking skills, see DARLING-HAMMOND, supranote 35,
at28-29, 108-09; Elliot W. Eisner, The Uses andLimitsofPerformaneAssessment, 1999 PHi
DELTA KAPPAN 658. On the importance of students acquiring a robust body of knowledge in
core subject areas, see E.D. HIRSCH, THE SCHOOLS WE NEEDAND WHY WE DONr HAvE ThEM
17-47 (1996).
79. See Neal Devins, Fundamentalist Christian Educators v. State: An Inevitable
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The beauty of vouchers, for anyone concerned about the current
lack of regulation of private schools, is that vouchers provide a
mechanism for states to greatly influence the nature and quality of
instruction in religious and other private schools. By offering this
large benefit to all private schools willing to comply with state
education standards, states can greatly influence the market for
private education. In all likelihood, a substantial percentage of
parents who send their children to religious schools would be
willing to sacrifice some control over their children's education in
order to be relieved of the burden of private school tuition. Many
religious leaders are well aware of this prospect, and worry that
voucher proposals are a Trojan horse, an insidious plan for bringing
the state into their domain." They see this only as a political
possibility-a strategy some legislators might pursue-when in fact
it is a moral and constitutional imperative.
B. Implications of the Equal ProtectionClause for Restrictions on
Specific InstructionalContent
There is another constitutional restriction on state spending that
is virtually ignored in the debate over vouchers among legal
scholars, even though it is clearly pertinent. This is the prohibition
on state support of private discrimination that the Supreme Court
has extrapolated from the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This prohibition has been the subject of
important court cases-including Supreme Court decisions holding
that states may not provide any aid, not even textbooks, to private
schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies.81 It is thus
Compromise, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 818, 825-34 (1992) (describing states' inability or
unwillingness to overcome Fundamentalist Christians"defiance ofcourt decisions upholding
state regulation of their schools).
80. See, e.g., Joe Loconte, Paying the Piper: Will Vouchers Undermine the Mission of
Religious Schools?, POLY REV., Jan. 1, 1999, at 30 (discussing religious educators' fears of
government meddling in private education); A. James Rudin, Florida'sVoucher Plan Faces
Challenges, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 12, 1999, at 7B (identifying Christian and Jewish
religious leaders' opposition to vouchers).
81. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1973) ("A state's constitutional
obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the old dual system of racially
segregated schools, but also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or
other invidious discrimination."). InNorwood, the Court specifically held that a textbook aid
program may be unconstitutional. See id at 465-67; see also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,
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clear as a matter of law that states must attach at least one string
to private school aid-namely, the requirement that recipients
admit students without regard to race. Existing voucher programs
do in fact all include a requirement that recipient schools have
racially nondiscriminatory admissions.82
The same principle underlying the prohibition on state funding
of racially exclusionary schools-namely, that states should
scrupulously avoid succoring private discrimination, lest they
effectively do indirectly what they are not permitted to do
directly-logically would also apply to discrimination based on
gender. Thus, one might expect that courts would also find
constitutionally problematic state aid to schools that exclude girls,
at least if, in the particular circumstances, the discrimination is
invidious-that is, if it fosters male privilege. Yet none of the
existing voucher programs preclude fimding of schools that
discriminate on the basis of gender in admission.83 As such, they are
subject to constitutional challenge on this basis as well.
Moreover, invidious discrimination by private schools goes far
beyond admissions policies, finding its way into the treatment of
students who are admitted and even into the content of instruction.
This discrimination that goes on inside some schools would appear
to be (from the state's perspective) far more threatening to
children's welfare. A child excluded from a school because of his
race, if he is aware of the exclusion at all (one might expect his
417 U.S. 556,568-69 (1974) ("[Alnytangible state assistance, outside the generalized services
government might provide to private segregated schools in common with other schools, and
with all citizens, is constitutionally prohibited if it has 'a significant tendency to facilitate,
reinforce, and support private discrimination.m (quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 466)).
82. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §229.0537(4) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring compliance with 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d), which is the federal law on prohibiting racial discrimination in programs
receiving federal financial assistance); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(AX4) (West Supp.
2000) (prohibiting discrimination "on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background"); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2XaX4) (West 1999) (requiring compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)).
83. Under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as state analogues to Title IX,
many private schools already are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of gender if
they receive state aid. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). Title IX and its state analogues,
however, all contain a religious exemption, which allows state aid to flow to religious schools
that engage in gender discrimination. See id. § 1681(a)(3). This discrimination by the state
(Le., in conferral of a legal protection) against girls harmed by religious schools' gender
discrimination violates the equal protection rights ofthose girls. See generally Dwyer, supra
note 17. I do not believe, however, that anyone has challenged the religious exemption on
these grounds.
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parents to shield him from that knowledge, if possible), suffers a
one-time, rather impersonal slight. A child subjected to discriminatory attitudes on a daily basis is likely harmed much, much
more. In fact, I would suppose that an African American child
would be better off being excluded from certain private schools than
being accepted and subjected to racist teaching.
It stands to reason that if the state may not support private
discrimination in any way, then it must condition aid on a
commitment by a recipient school to eradicate discriminatory
messages from its instruction, to maintain nondiscriminatory
admissions policies, and to allow some degree of state monitoring
to ensure that steps are being taken to comply. Moreover, it is even
clearer with instruction and treatment within schools than it is
with admissions policies that the prohibition on state funding
should extend to gender discrimination as well as to racial
discrimination. The state absolutely should not financially support
schools that routinely subject girls to explicit sexist teaching.
Thus, the Equal Protection Clause requires that states attach to
voucher programs not only a requirement of nondiscrimination in
admissions, but also a requirement that schools commit to
eradicatingracism and sexism from the content of their curriculum.
Even more so than academic curricular requirements, this would go
to the content of instruction, targeting specific forms of expression,
and so would surely exclude or disadvantage some religious groups.
The ethnographic literature on Fundamentalist Christian schools,
for example, shows that many such schools explicitly, routinely, and
unapologetically teach their students that females are inferior to
males, that gender equality defies God's word, and that a girl's
primary, if not sole, ambition in life, should be to serve a husband
and be a homemaker."s I consider in the next section objections to
restriction of content on free speech grounds. Regardless of what
view one takes on the question of whether parents and school
operators have a basic right to teach racism and sexism to children,
however, one must concede that it would be constitutionally
problematic for the state to subsidize such teaching."5
84. See DWYER, supra note 66, at 26.
85. A common response to this point from apologists for religious minorities is a blanket
denial that religious schools, or any significant number of religious schools, do anything to
harm children, without addressing the empirical literature to the contrary. See Michael W.
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The equal protection constraint on state spending might extend
to other areas as well. That would depend on whether the state is
proscribed from doing or teaching certain other things itself in
public schools. For example, it might be that courts would interpret
the Equal Protection Clause to preclude public schools from
discriminating against gay students or teaching that homosexuals
are morally inferior human beings. If so, the state might also be
precluded from funding private schools that do so, based on the
Norwood principle that the state may not do indirectly what the

Constitution forbids it to do directly.
Beyond anti-establishment and equal protection strictures,
additional constraints on state funding-constitutional or
moral-might also exist. May states fund schools that teach
religious bigotry? May states fund schools that impose severe
limitations on students' personal liberty-for example, by confining
them to cubicles all day or by prohibiting them from expressing
views inconsistent with a religious group's beliefs? In general, if the
state has concluded, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that a
certain practice is harmful to children, and acts on this conclusion
by prohibiting public schools from engaging in that practice, the
question necessarily arises whether the state can justifiably not
only tolerate such practices in private schools but actually subsidize
schools that engage in such practices.8 6 These seem important and

McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values are ll.Served by
Democratic Control of Schooling, in NOMOS: MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION (John

Holzworth & Stephen J. Macedo eds., forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 53, on file with
author); Stephen G. Gilles,Hey, Christians,Leave YourKidsAlonel, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY
149, 171-85 (1999) (reviewing JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGITS
(1998)). Questions about objectivity aside, a debate over the empirical evidence is in any
event unnecessary, because if it were in fact the case that no school is intentionally or
systematically engaging in sexist teaching and treatment of children, then no school should
have an objection to a requirement that it commit to eradicating sexist teaching and
treatment of children.
86. Different conclusions might emerge where the state merely has concerns that a
practice might be harmful, and prohibits the practice in public schools just because it is
highly risk averse. A different answer is particularly likely where the practice also might
have certain effects that the state believes beneficial. Thus, publicly supported private
schools might remain free to undertake some approaches to education that the state is
unwilling to attempt because of its concern that the approach might be harmful. In addition,
voucher schools would be free to experiment with approaches that the state does not take
and as to which the state does not have reason to fear that children will be harmed.
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pertinent questions that voucher proponents should be called upon
to address.

C. Objections
Examination of Establishment Clause and equal protection
strictures has led to the conclusion that vouchers must bring with
them substantial state oversight and control of private education.
These are necessary both to maintain the integrity of government
and to respect the rights of children. There has not been a great
deal of academic writing on the regulation aspect of vouchers, but
it is not difficult to anticipate a number of objections to this
conclusion.
Most proponents of evenhandedness in aid programs concede the
need for regulation to accompany aid as a general matter." For any
of these people to object to attaching regulatory strings to school
vouchers, they would have to argue that the child-rearing context
is different in a way that cuts in a direction opposite to the one I
have taken. They would have to argue that adults who choose to
patronize a religious provider of health care or some other service
for themselves must accept state regulation of that provider, while
adults who choose a religious provider of a service for theirchildren
do not have to accept such regulation, but rather are entitled to
receive the benefit of state aid and at the same time to be free of
state regulation. In other words, they would have to contend that
adults have greater rights when directing the lives of their children
than they do when they are directing their own. This is clearly
untenable. It finds no support in any widely accepted general
principles of individual rights. In fact, the opposite is true; our
rights to freedom are at their strongest when we are directing our
own lives and not affecting the lives of others, and are at their
weakest or are nonexistent when we seek to control the life of, or
even incidentally have a substantial effect upon, another person.
My children are other persons, and any "right" I have to control
their lives certainly is weaker than the right I have to control my
own. Religious belief does not change that.

87. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 60, at 21, 35-36; McConnell, supra note 24, at 1018.
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Some proponents of including religious service providers in
programs of state aid, however, believe that the state should,
exempt religious organizations from specific regulations that
8
conflict with an organization's religious beliefs. " They would
certainly object to the conclusion that states may-in fact,
must-use vouchers as a wedge to open the doors of God's schools
to state regulators, to restrict the freedom of parents and religious
groups to educate children in accordance with their deeply held
88. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 60, at 37 ("For faith-based providers to retain their
religious character, programs of aid must be written to specially exempt them from
regulatory burdens that would frustrate or compromise their religious character."); Lupu,
supra note 59, at 84 (arguing for exemptions in cases of extreme hardship to individuals
arising from their religious beliefs or from aspects of "secular conscience that are highly
analogous to protected religious claims"); MichaelW. McConnell,AccommodationofReligion,
1985 Sup. Or. REv. 1, 24-28 (noting examples of legal exemptions provided by the Supreme
Court); Perry, supra note 59, at 435-36 (arguing in favor ofreligious exemptions on matters
of religious conscience). Lupu and Perry would both broaden exemptions to include
nonreligious matters of conscience, in orderto avoidprivileging religion over nonreligion, and
Lupu (unlike Perry) would insist that the exemptions be broadened in that way before any
are allowed. See Lupu, supra note 59, at 384; Perry, supra note 59, at 415-16. But this
position still privileges religion. It takes religion and religious beliefas privilegedphenomena
to which other bases for wanting an exemption must be analogous ("highly so" in Lupu's
words) in order to be worthy of consideration. From the perspective ofthe nonbeliever, this
is somewhat analogous to the state telling members of racial minorities that they will be
allowed to enjoy the privileges historically enjoyed by white people if and only to the extent
that they act like white people. Lupu and Perry, like other supporters of exemptions, fail to
explain why religious and quasi-religious objections should alone merit exemptions, to the
exclusion of other reasons people have for wanting to be out from under certain governmentimposed rules, such as love for other individuals (e.g., a spouse, one's children, a group of
close-knit but unrelated persons), deep attachment to a piece of property (e.g., the family
home, the lake where one vacationed as a child), a life's passion (e.g., protecting the natural
environmentfrom pollution and development, makingexplosives), or even the greatpleasure
one gets in a particular activity (e.g., ingesting a certain drug, frolicking in the nude,
gambling). Pro-exemption arguments typically proceed from the assumption that religion is
more deserving than such other human motivations, without justifying that assumption on
the basis of the sort of secular grounds that the state ought to have in making exemption
decisions. As Perry stated:
[Glovernment may not take any action based on the view that the preferred
religion or religions are, as religion, better along one or another dimension of
value than one or more other religions or than no religion at all.... [No matter
how much some persons might prefer one or more religious practices,
government may not take any action based on the view that the preferred
practice or practices are, as religious practice ... better-truer or more
efficacious spiritually, for example, or more authentically American-than one
or more other religious or nonreligious practices or than no religious practice
at all.
Id. at 415.
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beliefs. They will worry about the apparent threat to parents'
rights, religious liberty, and religious pluralism from state control
over the content of instruction in religious schools, and insist that
religious schools should have a special exemption to any regulations
attached to vouchers.
I explained at the outset why neither parents nor any other
adults should be deemed to have any rights themselves in
connection with children's education, because the interests they
have at stake do not satisfy generally accepted criteria for
attributing rights to people.8 9 Children alone should have rights
with respect to the nature and content of their education. The
Supreme Court has held otherwise, of course, finding in Pierce v.
Society ofSisters0 that parents have a right to decide whether their
children will go to a public or private school. 9 As mentioned above,
however, the Court has also stated in dictum on several occasions
that parents do not have a right, even when motivated by religious
belief, to prevent the state from regulating instruction in private
schools, because the state has a compelling interest in protecting
the educational interests of children as it sees them. 92 There can be
no question then that, even in the absence of funding, states may
mandate that certain skills be fostered and certain content be
taught, and may take steps necessary to ensure that schools comply
with this mandate.
More controversial would be the prohibitionof specific content of
instruction-the targeting of particular forms of expression such as
racist or sexist views. The Supreme Court has not directly decided
whether states are free to proscribe particular messages in private
schools, so it is an open question whether there is a constitutional
right to convey such messages. I suspect that nearly every current
member of the Supreme Court would conclude that neither parents
nor private school teachers and administrators have a
constitutional right to teach racism or sexism to children, though
different Justices would undoubtedly have different reasons for that
conclusion. The Court as a body has stated, in cases involving
discriminatory admissions policies at private schools, that the
89.
90.
91.
92.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
See id. at 532.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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Constitution places no value on private discrimination, and that
private discrimination "has never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protection." 3 Thus, states may prohibit it. This
suggests that there is no underlying constitutional right to teach
racism or sexism to children.
Parents might also assert, in addition to a right of control over
children's lives, a right of free speech. They might contend that the
First Amendment precludes the state from preventing them or their
proxies from expressing particular views to their children on any
subject. Some legal scholars have in fact analyzed education as a
form of adult speech.94 This way of looking at schooling, however, is
inappropriate. To view children's education as a vehicle for adult
expression-rather than as a service to children designed to
promote children's welfare-is to treat children's lives
instrumentally, and that is morally and constitutionally improper.
Adults should not be deemed to have a constitutional right to make
children their sounding board, or to communicate something to the
outside world by the way they treat their children. No court could
give credence to such a claim while still treating children with the
respect they are owed as persons. Schooling is about the welfare of
children, not the gratification of adults. In addition, this claimed
right to free speech finds no support in the value of selfdetermination that undergirds individual liberty in our political
tradition, and it would be inconsistent with principles governing
situations in which people seek to use adults as involuntary
vehicles for expression.95
93. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
94. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
Limited PublicForum:UnconstitutionalConditionson "EqualAccess"forReligiousSpeakers
and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 710-14 (1996) ("A religious school's decision to
maintain a distinctive religious creed and to teach any and all subjects from a perspective
informed by that creed is at the absolute core of that religious institution's collective First
Amendment freedom ofexpression."). Paulsen also posits that schooling is a matter ofrights
of "free association," see id. at 714, but does not explain how an association among people
most of whom (i.e., the children) do not freely choose to associate can be protected by such
rights.
95. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,87 (1980) (upholding state
court ruling that owners of shopping mall must allow group of students to solicit signatures
for petitions in common area of mall, but emphasizing that "views expressed ... in passing
out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition ... will not likely be identified with those
of the owner"); id at 97-99 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that, even though the property
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Moreover, the notion that parents need control over their
children's schooling in order to communicate their beliefs to the
outside world or to the children is ridiculous. There are many ways
to communicate one's views to the outside world, ways much more
direct than inducing one's children to ape one's views or to act out
one's conception of the good. Moreover, only about 15% of children's
awake hours from birth to age eighteen are spent in school, 98 so
parents have complete control over the vast majority of their
offspring's childhood years regardless of what goes on in the schools
they attend.97 This suggests that what parents really seek in
owner"failed to establish a First Amendment claim" in the instant case, "[a] person who has
merely invited the public onto his property for commercial purposes cannot fairly be said to
have relinquished his right to decline to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to
an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 715 (1977))); Miami Herald Pubrg Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a
state may not require a newspaper to publish a political candidate's reply to a previously
published criticism). Indeed, even in situations where adults claim the liberty to say certain
things to children who are not "their own"-for example, teachers in public schools whose
views differ with what the state wants them to teach, courts reject the notion that such
adults have a right to do so as a matter of free speech or free exercise of religion. When
teachers have claimed a constitutional right to say or not say certain things to students,
contrary to the wishes ofschool district officials, courts have rejected their claim. See Palmer
v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979). Courts have done so in large part because
they do not view school as a forum for adult speech, but rather view it as a service for
children. As the court stated in Palmer, "Plaintiff's right to her own religious views and
practices remains unfettered, but she has no constitutional right to require others to submit
to her views and to forego a portion of their education they would otherwise be entitled to
enjoy." Id. at 1274. This view of education should be no different when it is a parent who
wants to control the content of a child's education. For children's sake, parents should have
input into curricular decisions, but parents should not be said to have any rights themselves
in connection with such decisions.
96. This percentage is based on an assumption that children are in school an average of
seven hours per day, 180 days per year, for thirteen of the first eighteen years of their lives,
and an assumption that children sleep an average of eight hours per day. Eliminating the
first two years of life from the calculation and adding a significant amount of time in
preschool raises the percentage to 18%.
97. I do not take the view that the state should radically curtail parents' freedom in that
remaining 85% ofchildren's awake hours. Intrusion into home life is much more disruptive
of family life than is regulation of schooling, which occurs in a more public setting. The costs
of that disruption for the child are likely to outweigh the benefits for the child, except where
parental practices in the home approximate existing definitions of child abuse or neglect.
Indeed, if one believes that what is best for children in general is, to use Professor Lupu's
metaphor, a "separation of powers" over children's lives as between parents and the state,
schooling is arguably the optimal sphere over which to give the state substantial authority.
Ira C. Lupu, The SeparationofPowers andthe Protectionof Children,61 U. CHi. L. REv. 1317
(1994). State control over schooling is the best, and possibly the only effective, safeguard
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objecting to state regulation of curricular content is not freedom of

expression, but rather state-conferred monopolistic control over
their children's minds, and such a monopoly over any person's mind
is antithetical to the values of the First Amendment.
If parents or teachers or religious organizations did have a
constitutional right to complete control over the specific views
communicated to their children in private schools, as a matter
either of free speech or freedom of religion, then we would need to
inquire whether the state may condition receipt of vouchers on
foregoing that constitutional right. Supporters of the
"unconstitutional conditions doctrine" would object to the state
doing indirectly-usingfinancial rewards to induce people not to do
what they have a constitutional right to do-what it may not do
directly-that is, by outright prohibition." In some contexts, the
Supreme Court has said that states may not condition important
public benefits on a willingness to give up one's constitutional
99
rights.
It is not necessary to enter here into the complex debate over the
vitality and reach of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
because there can be no dispute that the doctrine would not apply
to situations where there is a specific constitutional prohibition on
state spending. There are some things private persons may do that
against the harms that can arise from a complete parental monopoly over children's lives.
This point invites questions about home schooling that must be put off until another day.
98. See, e.g., Paulsen, supranote 94, at 713 ("Whatever the legallypermissible scope of
government authority to regulateprivate religious schools, that scope is not enlarged by a
religiousgroup's acceptanceof voucherfunds that the government hasprovided to students
on a religion-neutral basis.") (emphasis in original). Other academic supporters of
evenhanded aid to religious social service providers, however, accept that parents' freedom
to decline vouchers obviates the "strings attached" objection. See Michael W. McConnell,
Equal Treatment and Religious Discrimination,in EQUAL TnEATMENT OF RELIGION IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 30, 48 (Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Sopor eds., 1998).
McConnell also points out that a vouchers-with-regulations option actually diminishes the
coercive effects of the overall scheme of government funding for schooling, because the
prevailing scheme now requires parents to send their children to public school if they want
to take advantage of state education money, while vouchers would create the possibility of
receiving substantial state financial support without havingto enroll one's children in public
schools. See id. at 47-48.
99. See Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A
SeparabilityApproach, 43 UCLAL. REv. 371, 390-91, 418, 433, 442 (1995). But see also id.
at 374-76 (explaining that the doctrine has received little support from the Court in recent
decades).
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the state simply may not support. As discussed above, this is true
of religion and discrimination. While private individuals are free to
exercise religion, the Establishment Clause does not allow the state
to pay for religious exercise. And while individuals are free to
engage in invidious discrimination in many areas of private life, the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits the state from subsidizing such
discrimination. So the state may-in fact, must-condition benefits
it gives to private organizations on their compliance with
antidiscrimination rules. As a general rule, this should be
uncontroversial, and it would surely apply to school vouchers, which
constitute a quite substantial subsidy. Therefore, if the courts were
to conclude that the principle of nonsupport for discrimination
reflected inNorwoodextends beyond admissions policies to internal
practices, including content of instruction, then the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine would pose no obstacle to
conditioning vouchers on schools' commitment to eradicating
racism, and perhaps sexism as well, from their curriculum.
As for religious liberty and religious pluralism, the notion that
unregulated religious schools promote those values is
unsupportable. The objective of most such schools is to create
ideological conformity, not to promote free thinking and diversity.
Many aggressively repress their students' curiosity about different
world views. Also unsupportable is the notion that requiring all
schools to foster in their pupils critical and independent thinking
and to teach mainstream views in the sciences would pose a threat
to those values. More critical and independent thinking should lead
to more diversity, not less. In my view, the conflict over regulation
is really not about religious liberty and pluralism. It is really about
the desire of some adults to claim, beyond simply freedom with
respect to their own beliefs and religious exercise, the power to
confine the minds of their children. This desire conflicts with the
interest of their children in being able to make up their own minds
about religion and other life decisions and to have a broad range of
life options open to them. Ensuring that all children, in the 15% of
their waking hours spent in school, receive training in critical,
independent, and complex thinking and acquire the knowledge
necessary for higher education and a broad range of careers, would
pose no threat to religious liberty or religious pluralism. If
anything, it would promote those values.
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CONCLUSION

In the schooling context and in other child-rearing contexts, we
should be adopting a child-centered perspective--one that makes
the welfare and rights of children the center of attention. In the
case of vouchers, such a perspective yields the conclusion that
children in religious schools have a right to a share of state
spending on education, but also have a right to state supervision of,
and standard-setting, for their schools. And if this means that some
parents cannot use their children's schooling to proclaim the "good
news," because in the state's judgment the parents' news is not so
good, then so be it.
This conclusion is likely to trouble both no-aid separationists and
supporters of faith-based organizations. Both groups should see,
however, that their general positions regarding charitable choice,
whatever their merits, are weaker in child-rearing contexts,
particularly in the context of education. The no-aid position is
weaker because here we are talking about a matter of fundamental
well-being for children-a good education, which some children
might not receive in the absence of state funding of religious
institutions, through no fault of their own. The argument for
religious freedom is weaker because the freedom that is claimed is
not a matter of self-determination, but rather a matter of
controlling the lives of other persons.
Both sides must recognize that there can be no wall between
children and the state, and therefore, that if parents place their
children in a religious setting, there can be no wall separating that
religious setting from the state. State authority must be present in
every school, including every religious school, as a safeguard
against educational deprivation. It should not need an invitation.
But given the lack of political will to enter these schools without an
invitation, vouchers may be the only way to create that state
presence, which safeguard of children's educational interests. By
accepting vouchers, with the regulatory strings that must, as a
moral and constitutional matter, be attached to them, religious
schools effectively would be extending that invitation.
The state's entrance into the religious arena of parochial
schooling could, however, be largely metaphorical. In the realm of
education, it should be possible to monitor quality from a distance
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to a large degree. If states used more sophisticated tests than are
currently used, ones that assessed whether schools are fostering
higher-order thinking skills, helping students master advanced
scientific methods, and teaching all the content needed for higher
education, much or all of the monitoring of educational quality
could be done through review of tests administered by a school's
own officials and then submitted to a state agency. The best
evidence for the potential of such tests to provide a meaningful
measure of the quality of education in religious schools may be that
Fundamentalist Christian groups have vehemently opposed
proposals to require their administration. If, instead of trying to
impose such a requirement on private schools involuntarily, states
were to offer a very large financial incentive (i.e., vouchers) to
administer the tests voluntarily, they could defuse that opposition
and begin to institute genuine accountability in private schooling.

